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Abstract
This paper examines whether or not consumption risk sharing occurs in a panel of in­
dustrialized countries. We theoretically derive the international consumption insurance propo­
sition in a simple setup and show how it should be modified in more complicated models. We 
empirically analyze the implications of the proposition for pairs of countries over cycles of dif­
ferent length and find that (i) aggregate domestic consumption is completely insured against 
idiosyncratic real, demographic, fiscal and monetary shocks, but that it covaries with domes­
tic variables over long or infinite cycles. Also, the cross equation restrictions imposed by the 
theory are, in general, rejected. The policy implications of the results are discussed.
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1 In tro d u ctio n
The idea that agents attem pt to  insure their consumption streams against individual 
income or wealth fluctuations is a pervasive feature of many modem dynamic macro 
models. It arises in closed economy setups where there is heterogeneity in income or 
preferences across agents (see e.g. Mace (1991) or Marcet and Marimon (1992)), in 
open economy setups where countries with heterogeneous income streams borrow and 
lend internationally in order to bear only aggregate world-wide risk (see e.g. Backus, 
Kehoe and Kydland (1992)), and in models where consumption insurance may be a 
trigger (or a deterrent) for long term growth (see e.g. Devereux and Smith (1991) and 
Obstfeld (1992b)). As emphasized by Cochrane (1991), the basic idea of consumption 
insurance is in some respects the cross-sectional counterpart of the permanent income 
hypothesis. Complete insurance implies that the consumption of individual economic 
units (agents, families or countries) should not vary in response to idiosyncratic shocks 
while the permanent income hypothesis implies that the consumption of an individual 
economic unit should not vary over time in response to idiosyncratic transitory shocks.
Full consumption insurance obtains theoretically when financial markets are com­
plete or when there is a set of institutions which implement Pareto optimal allocations. 
Some of these institutional arrangements do exist in the real world. At the individual 
agent level, unemployment or medical insurance schemes, welfare and social government 
programs or even intergenerational transfers may help in reducing the effect of individ­
ual specific shocks. At a country level, charities or disaster relief programs, automatic 
international lending agreements or direct foreign aid may help to  insure national con­
sumption from catastrophic, idiosyncratic income fluctuations. Completeness of financial 
markets or the presence of institutions implementing first best allocations are, however, 
only sufficient conditions for full consumption insurance to take place. For example, 
Duffle and Huang (1985) show that continuous trading of a few long lived securities may 
implement Pareto optimal allocations. Similarly, recent work by Baxter and Crucini 
(1992) and Marcet and Singleton (1992) show that close to full insurance obtains even in 
situations where financial markets are strongly incomplete and no mechanism for imple­
menting first best solutions exists as long as agents have similar preferences (like more 
consumption to less and less variability to  more) and differ only in their income streams.
Although the mechanics of consumption insurance are very simple theoretically, 
casual empiricism suggests that international risk sharing is hardly a feature of the 
real world. It is often claimed that aggregate consumption of individual countries do 
react to country specific shocks. In support of this idea it is typically reported tha t poor 
underdeveloped countries starve when droughts or civil wars cut their own food supplies. 
For these countries, insurance markets seem to be imperfect or at least at least partially 
inaccessible, no institutions implementing first best exist and borrowing opportunities 
are limited (see Atkeson (1991) or Atkeson and Lucas (1992) for an explanation of this 
fact based on the existence of moral hazard and risk of repudiation). One additional 




























































































the portfolio of developed countries is composed in large part of domestic assets (see 
e.g. Tesar and Werner (1992)). Since there are instances when agents may be better 
off by changing the composition of their portfolio (see e.g. French and Poterba (1991)), 
it appears that they fail to reap the benefits of international diversification. While 
the question of why portfolios are so little diversified is a subject of an intense debate, 
several authors have provided a  simple rationalization of this phenomenon. For example, 
Stockman and Dellas (1989) show tha t nondiversification may occur if nontraded goods 
account for a large fraction of total consumption. Alternatively, Cole and Obstfeld 
(1991) and Obstfeld (1992a) have suggested that, given existing frictions, the gains 
from international diversifications may be small. This may occur because there are 
large informational costs involved in predicting future payoffs of foreign assets and/or 
because the cyclical properties of national incomes across developed countries are alike 
(see e.g. Backus and Kehoe (1992)) (see e.g. van Wincoop (1992) for an opposite view 
regarding the size of the gains).
The purpose of this research is to empirically examine whether the consumption 
insurance proposition holds at an international level. We begin in section 2 by showing 
the implications of international risk sharing in a very simple theoretical setup. We 
then describe the implications of consumption insurance in more complicated models 
and show that monotonic transformations of aggregate consumption must be highly 
correlated across countries, even when preferences are time nonseparable, when there 
are nonseparabilities across goods, when leisure choices are included and when there are 
nontraded goods. In this section we also derive the testable implications of the theory 
and compare our testing approach to others which exist in the literature.
The third section of the paper is devoted to empirically check the validity of the 
theory. With the exceptions of Obstfeld (1989), (1993) and Lewis (1993), the exist­
ing work tests risk sharing by computing the correlation between US consumption and 
consumption of some other country (typically Japan or Canada) with their respective 
cross country output correlation. Because consumption correlations tend to be lower 
than output correlations, international consumption insurance appears to  be violated, a 
phenomenon that Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1993) describe as one of the most impor­
tant unexplained puzzles in the international real business cycle literature. The reported 
evidence, however, concerns primarily the US and one may expect closer consumption 
ties between countries within the EEC community or between countries where labor mi­
grations have created a self-insurance mechanism of transfers to chronically depressed 
areas. In addition, since no standard errors are typically provided, comparisons of point 
estimates of the contemporaneous correlations need not provide conclusive evidence on 
the issue.
In section 3 we study the properties of pairs of aggregate consumptions for a panel 
of nine fairly homogeneous developed countries over the sample 1970-1990. We test the 
relevance of the theory of international risk sharing using a GMM technique. Since the 
theory predicts that aggregate domestic consumption within countries should not covary 




























































































orthogonality conditions emerge by interacting domestic variables (including variables 
proxying for real, fiscal, monetary and demographic factors), with the residuals of the 
regression between pairs of aggregate consumptions.
Because our simple model disregards issues connected with the allocation of re­
sources over time, we need to abstract from permanent income considerations in con­
ducting tests of international consumption insurance. In other words, in testing the risk 
sharing proposition, we wish to consider only those fluctuations which are stationary 
and this brings up the issue of which stationary inducing transformation to employ. 
Canova (1992) shows that different detrending methods leave cycles of different length 
in the data. By appropriately selecting the detrending procedure, we can therefore ex­
amine whether variables belonging to the information set of agents are correlated with 
the component of domestic aggregate consumption which has all its fluctuations over 
short (2-3 years), medium (4-6 years), long (7-10 years) or infinite cycles. A differenti­
ated analysis across frequencies may shed light on two important issues. First, whether 
measurement errors which are present in consumption data, and may be particularly im­
portant at high frequencies, affect the results of the tests. Second, whether consumption 
insurance primarily covers temporary or more permanent types of disturbances. Marcet 
and Marimon (1992) have shown that different informational structures lead to optimal 
risk sharing arrangements tha t cover different types of cyclical fluctuations. In addition, 
there is considerable debate in the policy circles regarding the provision of international 
insurance without permanent income redistribution across countries (see Melitz and Vori 
(1992)). Our analysis may therefore shed some light on this issue.
The international risk sharing proposition also imposes two additional restrictions: 
a  set of cross-equation constraints across the moments we test and the restriction that 
consumption correlations across countries must be perfect. Therefore, additional tests 
of the theory can be undertaken by examining the validity of these restrictions for each 
pair of countries.
As a  byproduct of our empirical analysis, we provide novel estimates and standard 
errors of the ratios of relative risk aversion coefficients of the representative agent of 
pairs of countries. These estimates are of independent interest for researchers engaged 
in calibrating international business cycle models and may provide a rationalization for 
the low international portfolio diversification observed in developed countries.
Four major results stand out from our empirical analysis. First, aggregate consump­
tion appears to be fully insured against shocks to real, fiscal, monetary and demographic 
variables. This is true regardless of the detrending method we consider. Second, ag­
gregate consumption covaries with some lagged country specific demographic and labor 
market variables over medium-long cycles. These two results are very robust to the pres­
ence of measurement errors, modifications of the empirical specification of the model, 
changes in the set of instruments employed and alterations of the functional form for the 
utility function. Third, the other two implications of the risk sharing proposition are, in 
many instances, rejected regardless of detrending methods we considered. However, one 




























































































among the countries of the rest of the panel. Fourth, we find very little evidence of 
risk sharing in the very long run, both in the sense that consumption patterns tend to 
diverge in the long run and that the long run component of domestic consumption reacts 
to domestic variables belonging to the information set of agents.
Several important conclusions emerge from our investigation which we discuss in 
section 4. These conclusions have relevant implications for the design of institutions 
intended to  implement first best allocations, for the opening new financial markets and 
for questions concerning fiscal independence of national governments in a unified Eu­
rope. First, because existing arrangements appear to provide enough insurance against 
domestic business cycle fluctuations, both the opening of international financial markets 
or the introduction of new government institutions intended to augment the efficiency 
of existing markets (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1992)) would be largely irrelevant 
for the welfare of the representative agents of these countries. This result is particu­
larly important for European countries since one of the foreseeable tasks of the central 
authority of a unified Europe is to provide consumption insurance to member coun­
tries (see e.g. Padoa-Schioppa Report (1987)). Second, because consumption insurance 
is harder to obtain for fluctuations of longer length, international institutions (old and 
new) should be more concerned with shielding consumers from this type of domestic fluc­
tuations. However, this type of insurance may involve semi-permanent redistribution of 
income. Therefore to fully evaluate the effects of these programs on the well being of 
agents, it is seems necessary to examine how the two components of policy interact in 
the context of a specific model of insurance and redistribution.
2 A  T h eo ry  o f  In tern ation a l R isk  S h arin g
We assume that there are J  countries in the world, j  =  1 and tha t there is
a  representative consumer in each country with preferences defined over an aggregate 
consumption good. Let sTt, r  =  1 , . . . ,  S  be a sequence of events where each event is a 
collection of states of the world which occurred up to t. sTt represents the information 
set available and it is assumed to be observed by the agents of all countries. We assume 
that S  is finite, that the conditional probability of sTt being realized is n (srt) and that 
7r(sTt) =  1. The lifetime expected utility of the representative consumer in each 
country is given by:
v = 'ZPtt  *MU[4 MM  («*)] (i)
t= 0  T=1
where 0 <  /3 < 1 is the discount factor common to all j ’s, Cj(sTt) is the consumption of 
country j at time t, event r  and bt(sTt) represents all those factors other than consump­
tion which affect agents’ utility. These factors may include leisure choices, government 
consumption, consumption of nontradables, home production effects (as in e.g. Benhabib, 
Rogerson and Wright (1992)), etc.




























































































each country has a stochastic endowment y{ (sTt) of the good at each t and th a t the world 
social planner takes frJ(sTt) as beyond her control. The problem she faces is:
max Y ,  ^(Srt)U[ci(Srt),H (sTt)] (2)q(̂ rt) j = l  t—0 T= 1
subject to  E /- iX j^ (S r t)  =  E /= i XiVtis-n), cj(srt) > 0, Vj, 0 <  ^  < l,V j, £ /_ ,  Xj =  
E / - i  =  1- The optimality condition for this problem can be written as:
(3)
where Ulrt = y  /it =  where Xt is the Lagrangean multiplier for the resource 
constraint and where <bj =  ^  is a  set of time invariant welfare weights which are related 
to  the initial wealth of each country and to the initial size of the country Xj- Implicit in
the formulation of the social planner problem is therefore the assumption that along the 
equilibrium path the planner will not reallocate wealth and tha t the size of the country 
(in terms of population) does not change with time. Also, the problem as stated, can 
be interpreted as the second stage of a maximization problem where the social planner 
decides how to distribute world consumption across countries after she has allocated 
resources optimally between world consumption and world investments.
Since Ht is independent of j ,  the above optimality condition implies tha t for any
j  A» i
l o g f / i , - l o g t £ ,  = 6 * (4)
where =  logtb* — log<bj. Equation (4) states that a monotonically increasing trans­
formation of the margined utility of consumption of any two countries j  and k must be 
equalized apart from a scale factor and that this condition must hold for all r  and t. A 
second implication of the optimality condition (3) is:
l o g t / i , - l o g t / : i =  AJ (5)
where U£rt = 7  £ /= i £/£.,, Aj =  l o g -  log<bj, 4>„ =  Equation (5) states
that, apart for a scale factor, a monotonically increasing transformation of the marginal 
utility of consumption of country j  is proportional to  an increasing transformation of 
the marginal utility of average world aggregate consumption and that this must hold for 
all countries j ,  all states r  and all periods t.
The first implication of optimal risk sharing arrangement refers to the consumption 
pattern of any pair of countries, the second one to the consumption pattern of one 
country relative to the average. These two implications are not distinct (taking the 
difference between any two indices j  and k  in (5) we obtain equation (4)) and the first is 
stronger than the second since there is a  loss of information in (5) due to the averaging 
of consumption across countries. That is to  say, if (4) holds for all j ,  k then (5) must 
be satisfied, while the reverse is not true. For panels with large cross sections it may 




























































































panel of countries one can test (4) directly on pairs of countries. Finally, note that since 
we have assumed that the welfare weights are time invariant, the country specific effect 
which appears in the constant of (4) and (5) will drop out of the expression when talcing 
the difference between two adjacent time periods.
The implications of equations (4) and (5) are very strong since they equate the 
marginal utility of consumption for all j ,  k and for all r  and t. Given the uneven quality of 
international consumption data, these two implications may fail to hold in practice even 
though they are true in theory due to different degrees and different serial correlations 
of measurement errors present in aggregate national data. It is therefore useful to study 
weaker conditions based on moments of the distributions of the logarithm of the marginal 
utility of aggregate consumption which may be more robust to measurement errors. From 
(4) it is straightforward to derive the following moment implications of the risk sharing 
proposition:
U Pogf/^J =  E[\og {/£ J  +  constant (6)
varpogt/^J =  var[k>gl£,] (7)
cov[log6£ t lo g b £ J  =  cov [log U£rt lo g f /£ j (8)
Note that (8), together with the fact that cov[logU ^t log =  covpog log
implies that the logarithms of the marginal utilities of consumption for any pair j , k are 
perfectly correlated. Note also tha t (7) and (8) hold regardless of the welfare weights 
employed in the social planner problem as long as they are constant. Therefore, there 
are two senses in which this last set of conditions is weaker than (4). First, because they 
imply tha t international consumption insurance holds for moments of the data instead 
of point by point in time and state. Second, because these relationships can be examined 
even when the welfare weights used by the social planner are unknown. In section 3 we 
will focus on the moment implications of the theory and we will jointly examine (6)—(8).
So far we have not discussed the decentralization scheme which may support the 
optimal risk sharing allocations. To achieve the optimal allocation in decentralized 
economies it is common to assume the existence of equity markets in each country (as 
in Lucas (1982)) or of complete international contingent claim markets where countries 
trade claims to  each others income (as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)). However, 
even when contingent claims markets are missing, sufficient richness in the set of trading 
opportunities may partially compensate for the lack of variety in the available securities 
(see e.g. Duffie and Huang (1985)). At the polar extreme, the complete lack of interna­
tional financial markets is not sufficient to prevent risk sharing. For example, Persson 
and Tabellini (1992) describe a cooperative political equilibrium arrangement which im­
plements optimal allocations even when international financial markets are absent. Here 
we leave the form of the financial instruments available unspecified because the presence 
of financial markets which are efficiently run is only a sufficient condition for the im­
plementation of the optimal allocations and other arrangements, which may involve, for 





























































































2.1 Setting Up the Tests
To give empirical content to the theory, we specify a parametric functional form for the 
instantaneous utility function for each j:
U(4M)  =  [(«& )*-''- 1] if Oj +  1 (9)
1 ~ ai
U (4 ,b i)  =  log(cj) +  log(6J) otherwise (10)
where a, is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of country j .  Although we have adopted 
a CRRA specification, any member of the a general class of HARA utility functions would 
serve the purpose for the empirical work (see e.g. Brennan and Solnick (1989)). We have 
chosen a CRRA utility function because of growth considerations. Devereux, Gregory 
and Smith (1992), who have studied the implications of the risk sharing proposition in 
an international model of the business cycle where leisure choices are included, have used 
a utility function of the form:
ff[Ct(Srt),^(Srt)] =  lo g ( c ,- 7 n t) (11)
For these preferences, the marginal utility of consumption is not independent of labor 
supply choices but the income elasticity of leisure is zero. Note however that these 
preferences are not of the HARA class and are incompatible with balanced growth.
As an alternative one could have simply specified a semi-parametric form for the 
instantaneous utility function. For example, we could have assumed that c( and bt 
interact multiplicatively but left unspecified the functional form for each of them. While 
this approach is robust to the misspecifications of the functional form for instantaneous 
preferences, it seems to provide very little gains over a parametric specification in terms 
of interpretability of the results.
Given the above functional form for preferences, we let
X u  =  logcj -  (— )logc{; - f i  (12)
X»  =  (logc02 - ( - ) 2(logc?)2 (13)
* 3. =  (logc,*)2(— JcorrOogcJ'.logcj)- (logc?)(logc?) (14)
where corr(logcf,logc() =  1 by the discussion following (8), is a function of the 
fixed effect of country j  and we let X t = [An, X2t, X31]'. If the theory of international 
consumption insurance holds X t should be unpredictable. That is to say, for any variable 
Z t belonging to the information set sTt, Et[Xt\Zt\ =  0. Since we have assumed th a t sTt 
is common to  all countries, Z t may in principle include variables of all countries in 
the sample. However, since the theory suggests that the log of the marginal utility 
of consumption is unpredictable given country specific characteristics we will only use 




























































































should be excluded from Z t since they are likely to be uninsurable and will therefore 
induce correlation between the instruments and X t. An example may clarify this point. 
Suppose the J  countries are non-oil producing and that Z t includes oil prices. Then 
Et[Xt\Zt\ can not be zero when Z t changes since total wealth has changed. However, 
if among the J  countries there are some oil producing nations, world wealth may stay 
constant and oil prices may be a reasonable instrument in testing risk sharing.
In theory X t may include omitted variables or time varying components due to 
idiosyncratic preference disturbances. In the empirical implementation of the test, X t 
may also include functions of the measurement errors in consumption. If the components 
of X t are serially correlated, care must be exercised in selecting the Zt vector because 
some instruments may be either correlated with some of the unobservable components 
or measured themselves with an error which is correlated with measurements errors in 
X t and this may invalidate the test. For example, if measurement errors in consumption 
are highly serially correlated, lagged consumption may not be a valid instrument. Simi­
larly, current national income (or current GDP) may not be a valid instrument since its 
measurement error may be highly correlated with the measurement error in consump­
tion (see also Cochrane (1991)). One solution to these problems is to  take instruments 
sufficiently lagged in the past so as to  decrease the extent of the serial correlation in 
the measurement errors. This procedure has however the disadvantage of also reducing 
the power of the test since the correlation of the instruments with the current marginal 
utility of consumption will be smaller. As an alternative, one could simply eliminate 
from Z t those variables which are suspected of being correlated with the measurement 
error in consumption.
While any variable Z t belonging to sTt is a legitimate instrument to examine the 
basic orthogonality conditions imposed by the theory, the tests conducted using generic 
Zt’s may be uninformative since there may be time series aspects of Z( which need not be 
insurable. That is, the theory of international risk sharing predicts that the logarithm 
of the marginal utility of domestic consumption is insensitive to idiosyncratic shocks 
after we account for its dependence on the logarithm of the marginal utility of foreign 
consumption (see also Mace (1991)). A more powerful test of the theory can therefore 
be constructed by using as instruments the component of Z t which is unexplained by 
past values of Z t’s. To construct the unpredictable component of Zt we use a VAR 
methodology and obtain shocks by projecting country specific variables proxying for 
real, fiscal, monetary and demographic factors on their past values. These innovations 
axe then used as instruments to test the international risk sharing proposition.
As is clear from the definition of the X t vector, the theory of international risk 
sharing also imposes restrictions across the three orthogonality conditions we examine. 
Risk sharing, in fact, implies that the slope coefficient of all three moments (12)-(14) 
is equal to  the ratio of the coefficients of relative risk aversions of the representative 
agents of the two countries. These restrictions are distinct from the basic orthogonality 
condition E[Xt \Zt\ =  0, are independent of the functional form for utility we use (see (6) -  




























































































examine their validity we employ a Wald test using the unrestricted estimates of the slope 
coefficient of each of the moment conditions.
Finally, risk sharing implies that consumption correlations for any pair of coun­
tries should be perfect. We test this third implication using a t- te s t and the point 
estimates and the standard deviations obtained from the GMM estimation of the three 
orthogonality conditions.
2.2 Extensions
The restrictions on international aggregate consumption we derived in the previous sub­
sections are obtained from a very simple model and it is legitimate to  ask what kind 
of restrictions are implied by international risk sharing in more general setups. In this 
section we briefly show that the basic restrictions of the model are very general and hold, 
in a somewhat modified form, in richer setups.
We consider first the case where preferences do not display time separability and 
specialize the instantaneous utility function to be U{dt ,Vt) =  log(Ci — otCl-i) +  log(frj), 
where a  can be either positive (habit persistence) or negative (durability) (see Mace 
(1991)). It is easy to check tha t (4) holds but now the marginal utility of consumption de­
pends on current and past levels of consumption. Note also that, because versions of the 
Porteus-Kreps preferences are observationally equivalent to von Neumann-Morgenstem 
preferences with a particular form of habit persistence (see e.g. Constantinides (1991)), 
the basic implications of risk sharing are also robust to alterations of the von Neumann- 
Morgenstem assumption on agents preferences.
The restrictions we derived are robust to modifications of the assumption tha t there 
is only one good in the model. For example, c( may be an aggregate of j goods, each of 
which is produced in only one of the j-countries. As Cole and Obstfeld (1991) suggest, 
as long as there is complete specialization, i.e. country j  receives an endowment of good 
j  only, pairs of aggregate consumption should still satisfy (4). However one should stress 
that, in this setup, country specific disturbances change the terms of trade and these 
changes may automatically pool national risk. For example, in Cole and Obstfeld’s 
model a technology shock induces, other things being equal, a  negative relationship 
between terms of trade and output. We can also relax the exchange economy setup, 
introduce production, assume that production requires capital goods from one or more 
countries and still produce the result that, given the logarithm of the marginal utility 
of consumption of country fc, no variable other than a  constant may be im portant in 
predicting country j  logarithm of the marginal utility of consumption (see Cole and 
Obstfeld (1991)).
As already mentioned, our framework is general enough to allow for the presence of 
variables other than consumption in the utility function of agents. The only crucial re­
striction that is needed for (4) to be satisfied is that all these additional effects (which are 




























































































tion. For example, if there are tradable and nontradable goods in the economy and the in­
stantaneous utility function is of the form: f/[cj(srt),&J(sTt)] =
where nt\ is the consumption of the nontradable good produced in country j ,  r j  the con­
sumption of tradables in country j  and 7 , is the share of tradables in total consumption 
in country j ,  the optimality condition is
logW) -  !  log(ij) =
7j ( l  — (7j) — 1
7 ^  _ 1(T  ̂ _  J [(1 -  7 j)(l -  <?*) lognt\ -  (1 -  7,)(1 -  <Jj) logntf] +
— r--— r------ (log 4>* — log 4>J +  log 7* — log 7j) (15)
7 j( l -  Oj) ~  1
From equation (15), it is clear that when the marginal utility of consumption of the 
tradable good is nonseparable in the consumption of the traded and nontraded goods, 
fluctuations in the endowment of domestic and foreign nontradables will affect the opti­
mal allocation of the traded good. In particular, the optimal allocation will depend on 
the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods (7 ,-), the intertempo­
ral elasticity of substitution (d-) and the joint stochastic processes for traded and non 
traded goods (see e.g. Tesar (1993)).
The argument we have just described also holds if, rather than nontradables, we 
assume tha t there is an exogenous government consumption expenditure affecting the 
utility of the agents of their own country. The optimality condition of the social planner 
problem in this case requires equalization of the marginal utility of private consumption 
across countries. The logic of this case is identical to the one previously described because 
private and government consumption expenditure may enter in a nonseparable way in 
the utility function and government consumption cannot be reallocated across countries.
Another case of interest is one where leisure is a choice variable for the agents 
(and for the social planner). To make the problem meaningful we also abandon the pure 
exchange economy setup and assume that ift is produced with domestic labor according to 
a general decreasing returns to scale production function satisfying standard regularity 
conditions. Let y,t =  / /  (1 — Ljt) where (1 — Ljt) is the amount of labor of country 
j  used to produce yJt and f l  is time varying because of a country specific technology 
disturbance. We assume an instantaneous utility function of the form f/[ct(sTt), ^ (sn )] =  
-py- ((cj )7j (L{) ) 1 ~°i where 7j  now represents the share of consumption in the utility 
function of country j .  Then the optimality conditions of the social planner problem can 
be summarized as follows:
log cj -  log <* =  log L\ -  log L\ +  log f ]t -  log f kt +  Bjk (16)
where / j ,  is the marginal product of labor in country j  and where Bjk = log ■1 —
log The modified condition for international consumption insurance therefore




























































































differences in leisure and productivity profiles. No other variable should be important in 
predicting differences in aggregate consumption across pairs of countries.
One final case which is of interest is when there is some heterogeneity within each 
country. In this situation one can assume that the social planner maximizes a weighted 
average of the expected utility of the median voter of each country (as in Persson and 
Tabellini (1992)). Then the international risk sharing condition (4) still holds but now 
the expressions involve the marginal utility and the individual characteristics of the 
median voter in each country.
In all the extensions we have presented here, testing the international consumption 
insurance proposition with private aggregate consumption data is still valid as long 
as the instruments are judiciously chosen. In other words, if an econometrician omits 
variables which are either nonseparable with consumption or enter in the computation 
of the optimal social planner rule, she may reject the risk sharing proposition even if 
it holds true. In the case of time nonseparable preferences this would be the case if 
lagged consumption is an element of the instrument set. When there are tradables and 
nontradables which are nonseparable in the utility function, instruments like domestic 
income or domestic production would be significant in predicting country j  consumption 
of tradables because they may be correlated with consumption of nontradables in country 
j  (as noted e.g., by Dellas and Stockman (1989)). Finally, if leisure is a  choice variable 
and one implements the test using data only on aggregate domestic consumption, one 
may find tha t variables correlated with the marginal product of labor or with leisure 
may be significant in explaining differences in private consumption across countries.
One way to check whether this source of misspecification is crucial for our con­
clusions is to include in Z t all these variables at a second stage and check whether the 
basic empirical results are altered. If the results do change, one can respecify the utility 
function in order to capture these effects. If they are robust, we can conclude (i) that, 
if they exist, these effects are minor and (ii) that failure of risk sharing to hold are not 
due to  comovements with idiosyncratic fluctuations in these variables.
2.3 A Comparison W ith the Existing Literature
Although the issue of consumption insurance has a long history (see e.g. Wilson (1968)) 
and has been dealt with theoretically in many research papers, relatively few formal 
empirical investigations of the implications of the consumption insurance proposition 
have been conducted. Townsend (1989), Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991) and Atkeson 
and Bayoumi (1991) have investigated whether consumers within communities, coun­
ties or states respond only to aggregate but not to idiosyncratic shocks. The former 
two studies use individual income as a  proxy to measure idiosyncratic shocks and in­
vestigate the consumption insurance proposition using pooled time series cross sectional 
regressions. The latter two employ a number of individual characteristics to represent 
idiosyncratic shocks and test the insurance proposition using cross sectional regressions. 




























































































shocks, Mace and Cochrane find that there are also many sources of individual risk (such 
as long illnesses or long unemployment spells) which can not be insured by individual 
consumers.
At an international level, and to the best of our knowledge, only Obstfeld (1989), 
(1993) and Lewis (1993) have formally examined the risk sharing proposition. The results 
of their investigations are mixed. They detect some evidence of market incompleteness 
but they also find tha t risk sharing has increased after 1973. Because our model specifi­
cation, estimation technique, testing approach, data set and panel employed differ from 
theirs, our investigation provides an alternative and complementary framework to eval­
uate the usefulness of the complete market abstraction in characterizing international 
consumption allocations.
Many authors (see e.g. Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1992), Devereux, Gregory and 
Smith (1992) or Baxter and Crucini (1992)) have provided informal evidence suggesting 
that the cross country consumption correlations are less than perfect and, in general, 
lower than the cross country correlations of national outputs. This empirical evidence 
combined with simulation results obtained in models where perfect risk sharing occurs 
have lead Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1993) to  label the cross country relationship 
between consumptions and incomes a major puzzle. While this evidence is suggestive 
of the possible lack of international risk sharing, there are at least three reasons why 
these results are not necessarily conclusive. First, perfect consumption correlations is 
only one of three possible implications of risk sharing. Second, no statistical conclusions 
can be drawn because standard errors for the correlations are not provided. Third, 
as we have already argued in previous sections, low private cross country consumption 
correlations do not necessarily imply that international risk sharing is absent, especially 
when nontraded goods, government expenditure or leisure appear in the utility function 
of the representative agent.
Some authors have also provided more direct evidence on the lack of risk shar­
ing across developed countries by calculating the welfare costs of closing international 
financial markets or restricting capital flows and showing that the costs are large (see 
e.g. Brennan and Solnick (1989)). The conclusions regarding the magnitude of the wel­
fare costs of limiting trade in financial markets is, however, the object of current dispute, 
see e.g. Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Mendoza (1991), Obstfeld (1992a) and van Wincoop 
(1992). In addition, recent work by Baxter and Crucini (1992) shows that, within stan­
dard versions of real business cycle models, the presence of an integrated market for 
uncontingent government bonds may be sufficient to provide almost complete insurance 
from country specific technology shocks. Finally, the extent of the losses due to the lack 
of private risk sharing or the lack of a complete array of international financial markets 
may also be upward biased if formal and informal government agreements and the terms 
of trade changes provide semi-automatic insurance (stabilization) schemes for domestic 
residents.
Other authors have focused on the capital mobility aspect of the risk sharing propo­




























































































for real interest rate differential (see e.g. Obstfeld (1986)). It is often argued tha t when 
international risk sharing occurs, capital mobility should be high, real interest rate dif­
ferentials should be equalized across countries, portfolios should be diversified and the 
correlation between domestic savings and domestic investment should be low. While 
these implications are not necessarily true when some consumption goods are nontraded 
and, as Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1993) have argued, 
high saving and investment correlations need not indicate imperfections in capital mar­
kets, the existing evidence on these issues is somewhat contradictory (see van Wincoop 
and Marrinan (1993)). While capital mobility appears to be small, in the sense that 
current account imbalances are small on average for a  cross section of countries, riskless 
bond markets appear to be substantially integrated and the cross country real interest 
rate differentials appear to be very small.
3 A n  E m p irica l In v estig a tio n
3.1 Business Cycle Implications
Before we empirically investigate whether aggregate consumption data conform to the 
theory of international risk sharing, there is one preliminary step th a t needs to be ad­
dressed.
Restrictions (6) through (8) hold for any frequency of the spectrum as long as ag­
gregate consumption is stationary. Since there are many detrending filters which make 
consumption stationary, it is worthwhile to ask which procedure is the most appropriate 
to use in testing the theory. Canova (1992) has demonstrated that different detrend­
ing methods leave stationary cycles in the data which have different average length. In 
particular, th a t paper shows that a  first order differencing (FOD) filter leaves in the 
data cycles with a periodicity which is less than 3 years, that the Hodrick and Prescott 
(HP) filter leaves in the data cycles with a  periodicity between 4-6 years and th a t a 
linear detrending method (LT) leaves very long cycles (7-10 years periodicity) in the 
data. To illustrate the features of these three detrending procedures, we plot in figure 1 
detrended US consumption data obtained with each of the three filters. Hence, by appro­
priately selecting a particular detrending method, one can investigate the consumption 
insurance relationship across various frequencies of the spectrum .1 Such a differentiated 
analysis may shed light on two issues. First, whether the relationship is stronger when 
idiosyncratic disturbances have a very temporary or a  more permanent nature. Second, 
whether the large component of measurement error present in consumption data a t high
1 It is useful to stress that an approach that separates the information by frequency shares some 
similarities with “band spectrum regression” technique of Engle (1974), and with the procedure used 
in Canova and Dellas (1993), where one computes the average coherence between pairs of series in a 





























































































frequencies is responsible for some of the dramatic results presented in the literature (see 
e.g. Devereux, Gregory and Smith (1992)).
In our empirical investigation we consider quarterly per-capita total real aggre­
gate consumption data for 9 OECD countries: Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA and Germany. We concentrate on these nine nations 
because they are sufficiently homogeneous as a group and because they are the only ones 
with consistent quarterly data for a  sufficiently long period. The sources of the data, 
its definition and its sample availability are described in the appendix. Per-capita total 
real aggregate consumption may not be the ideal measure of consumption to use in our 
tests especially if there are persistent cross country differences in the various compo­
nents of aggregate consumption (such as services, which account for a large portion of 
nontraded goods) or if the consumption of some countries has more durability aspects 
than others. As an alternative, one could use consumption data on those non-durable 
goods which are easily tradable and transportable. There are two drawbacks to this 
choice, however. First, disaggregated consumption data at a quarterly frequency ex­
ist only for a very limited number of countries, so tha t the power of our cross country 
comparison would be reduced. Second, to implement the test using non-durable (or 
tradable) consumption one has to make the assumption that the effect of non-durables 
(or tradables) is separable from the effect of other components of consumption. If this 
assumption is not satisfied, the misspecification introduced in the testing procedure may 
well be larger than the one introduced using total consumption. Finally, one should also 
remember that various categories of consumption are not necessarily measured in the 
same way and at the same time in each country. In other words, any available measure 
of consumption is likely to be unsatisfactory since numerous sources of misspecification 
may be introduced in the testing procedure. Therefore, one should be very cautious in 
interpreting the results of the tests.
Tables 1 and 2 present the basic results of our investigation. Table 1 reports the 
significance level (in percentage) of a x 2 test for the overidentifying restrictions implied 
by the risk sharing proposition when we jointly use the three moment conditions (6)- (8) 
and the instruments are a constant, domestic real variables (lagged outputs), domes­
tic demographic variables (lagged population) and domestic nominal variables (lagged 
prices). All data is logged before any transformation undertaken. The first panel of the 
table presents the results for LT detrended data, the second panel for HP detrended 
data and the third panel for FOD detrended data. In all the tests presented in this table 
we apply to the instruments the same detrending transformation we employed on the 
consumption data. That is, if we linearly detrend consumption, we also linearly detrend 
the instruments to conduct the test. This allows us to concentrate on the comovements 
between consumption and the instruments at a particular frequency and makes the cross 
frequency comparisons more appropriate. In conducting the tests we only use lagged 
values of the instruments (as opposed to current and lagged values) in order to minimize 
endogeneity problems, which may be present primarily with output (or income) data, 




























































































measurement errors are correlated with measurement errors in consumption. Table 2 
presents the results of testing the overidentifying restrictions implied by the risk sharing 
proposition when we still use the three moment conditions (6) - (8) but the instruments 
are a constant and current and lagged shocks to real, demographic and nominal domestic 
variables. Current shocks are used because they are exogenous to agents’ information 
set and they are unlikely to be correlated with the measurement error in consumption. 
Shocks are constructed by taking the residuals of a VAR(4) on domestic output, domestic 
population and domestic prices.
Two main results stand out from these tables. First, aggregate domestic con­
sumption is insensitive to idiosyncratic shocks in domestic instruments, a result which is 
consistent with international consumption insurance. Second, aggregate domestic con­
sumption seems to covary with some of the domestic instruments but the strength of 
this association depends on the length of the cycles considered. For example, over short 
cycles, the risk sharing proposition is never rejected while for longer cycles, there are 
some comovements between domestic consumption and some of the instruments.
In order to understand why the result differs in the two tables, it is important 
to identify which instrument covaries with domestic consumption. It turns out that 
over medium-long cycles, aggregate consumption covaries primarily with demographic 
variables while it is essentially unaffected by movements in the other instruments. This 
should not come as a surprise since the tests are performed on per-capita consumption 
data and population, which is highly serially correlated within each country and does not 
move in a similar way over the medium long run across the nine countries. In addition, 
if we note tha t innovations in demographic variables are small over the sample under 
consideration, we find that the results of the two tables are very consistent.
There are a t least four explanations for why the strength of the association be­
tween consumption and the instruments varies with the detrending method. First, it 
may be the case th a t aggregate consumption is insensitive to fluctuations in domestic 
variables when these movements are very temporary in nature. Marcet and Marimon 
(1992) showed tha t in an economy with participation constraints this will be the case: 
agents will insure only short run fluctuations so tha t domestic consumption will track 
permanent income in the medium-long run. Alternatively, it may be the case that fluc­
tuations which last longer may be harder to insure against because they may signal the 
presence of structural imbalances in the economy. Second, it is well known tha t aggre­
gate consumption data tend to be well approximated by random walks. That is, the 
cyclical component of aggregate consumption which is extracted using a FOD filter is, 
for most practical purposes, unpredictable given available information. In this case the 
tests performed using FOD detrended data  may be very weak, since no variable, either 
domestic or foreign, is useful in predicting consumption movements over short cycles. We 
do not believe this explanation entirely accounts for the results for two reasons. First, 
when we use FOD detrended data, the estimated coefficient on the foreign aggregate con­
sumption is significant in almost half of the cases, therefore contradicting the idea that 




























































































foreign aggregate consumption always has a significant coefficient but we still reject the 
risk sharing proposition in about one-third of the cases. In other words, there appears to 
be little relationship between the significance of the coefficient on foreign consumption 
and the rejection of the risk sharing proposition so that the above explanation is, at 
best, suggestive. The differences we observed can also be explained with the fact that 
measurement errors may be less correlated across variables at high frequencies than at 
low frequencies. This could be the case, for example, if it is easier to measure growth 
rates than levels. In this situation the pattern of covariations at longer cycles can be 
attributed to cumulative errors which are made in measuring variables. Although in 
principle this explanation has some appeal, it is hard to quantify how important this 
type of problem is in the present context. A final possible explanation for the pattern of 
results has to do with the type of consumption data we are using. Because disaggregated 
data for many countries do not exist, we are forced to test international risk sharing us­
ing total aggregate consumption. However, this may create problems in interpreting the 
results because consumer durables are more likely to respond to more permanent fluc­
tuations in the instruments. In other words, if important components of total aggregate 
consumption have some durability aspect, it may turn out tha t aggregate consumption 
is acydical over very short cycles but that it reacts to the state of the economy when 
the length of the fluctuations increases. While this fact constitutes a m atter of concern, 
it should be noted that it is not fully satisfactory as an explanation because the pattern 
of cross-frequency results we found is robust to the choice of the pair of countries de­
spite the fact that the durable component of total consumption is not very homogeneous 
across countries.
To check the robustness of our conclusions, we conducted several sensitivity exer­
cises. We have two goals in mind: first, we are interested in knowing whether the pattern 
of results depends on the choice of instruments or on some of the auxiliary assumptions 
we have made in performing the tests. Within this class of exercises we checked whether 
the presence of serially correlated measurement errors is responsible for the pattern of re­
jections present in table 1 by changing the timing of the instruments and performing the 
tests using current and lagged instruments. To quantify the importance of measurement 
errors for the tests we added current income and lagged consumption to the instruments. 
To examine whether the particular choice of variables is responsible for the results we 
also modified our proxies for real, demographic and monetary instruments and included 
next exports as an instrument. To check whether the presence of a country specific effect 
mattered in the tests we omitted a constant in testing (6). Finally, to examine whether 
risk sharing has increased after 1973, we rerun all the tests using data from 1974 to 1990.
Second, we study whether a  misspecification of the empirical relationship is respon­
sible for some of the results we obtain in tab 'e 1. In section 2.3 we showed that when 
government expenditure or leisure enters the utility function, the risk sharing proposition 
implies tha t consumption across countries should be equalized after taking into account 
terms due to  government expenditure, hours or productivity of labor. It is possible that 




























































































so the rejections we observe may be the result of misspecifications. In addition, it may 
be that the CRRA specification for the utility function of the representative agent is 
incorrect and a (locally) quadratic utility function is more appropriate. In that case 
international consumption risk sharing implies tha t the cyclical component of consump­
tion (as opposed to the cyclical component of the logarithm of consumption) should be 
proportional across countries. To examine whether these forms of misspecification are 
present, we added lagged government expenditure and lagged employment to the set of 
instruments and also ran the tests on the level of the cyclical components of consumption.
The results obtained in tables 1 and 2 appear to be surprisingly robust and none 
of the conclusions is affected by any of our modifications. Particularly important is 
the robustness of the results to the elimination of an exponential trend in the data 
(which contrasts with the results of Mace (1991) at a  micro level) and to the exclusion of 
employment and government expenditure from the instruments, which suggests tha t a 
misspecification of the arguments of the utility function is not the reason for the failure 
of the risk sharing proposition over long cycles.
One other important implication of the above results is that government consump­
tion expenditure is essentially acyclical in all the countries of the panel. This may signal 
the lack of direct programs aimed a t insuring private consumption through automatic 
movements in government expenditure and it is in contrast with some of the results 
of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) who suggest that government expenditure is an 
important determinant of cyclical fluctuations in aggregate consumption in the US.
As emphasized in section 2, apart from orthogonality condition, the international 
risk sharing proposition also implies a set of cross equation restrictions on the estimates 
of the slopes of (6)- (8) . These restrictions are independent of the exact parametrization 
of the utility function and can be used to form an alternative and possibly stronger test 
of the theory. To check whether the estimates of the slopes obtained from three different 
moment conditions are the same we use a Wald test. The results are very strong. 
Regardless of the instruments used or of the frequency considered, the cross equation 
restrictions are always soundly rejected. Hence, although aggregate consumption does 
not covary with idiosyncratic domestic shocks, the stronger implication th a t (6) - (8) 
provides the same information does not hold true.
Despite the rejection of the cross-equation restrictions, our estimates of the slope 
coefficients in (6)—(8) are of independent interest for several reasons. First, they may 
be useful to researchers engaged in calibrating international business cycle models since 
they provide a measure of how risk averse a fictitious representative agent of each country 
is relative to the representative agent of a  base country. Second, they may provide some 
rationale for the apparent lack of international diversification in the portfolio of different 
countries (see e.g. French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1992)).
To give a direct meaning to  the slope estimates, and because more is known about 
the estimate of this parameter for US consumers, we use the relative risk aversion of the 




























































































relative risk aversion coefficients obtained with (7) and their standard errors. We chose 
to present only the estimates obtained with (7) because they are more reasonable given 
that in the estimation they are constrained to be positive. We confine point estimates of 
the relative risk aversion obtained with the other two conditions to an appendix available 
on request.
It is immediate to note that the sets of estimates obtained with different instru­
ments are neither statistically nor economically different. In general, it appears tha t the 
representative agent of half of the countries are less risk averse than the representative 
agent in the US. Since the ratio of relative risk aversion coefficients across countries is one 
of the deep parameters of the model, one would also hope that estimates of these ratios 
do not differ too much across frequencies. We therefore conducted a formal Wald test to 
check whether this is the case. The evidence on this issue is mixed. Except for the case 
of Prance, Switzerland and the UK, estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficients 
obtained with LT and FOD are not significantly different. On the other hand, except 
for the case of UK and Switzerland, estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficients 
obtained with HP and FOD are significantly different. Finally, in all cases, estimates of 
the relative risk aversion coefficients obtained with HP and LT are significantly different. 
One should however note that even though the test rejects the hypothesis that the three 
sets of coefficients sire the same, except in the case of Switzerland, the range of estimates 
obtained over different frequencies is economically small.
Obstfeld (1989) has also provided estimates of the risk aversion parameter for the 
US, Germany and Japan. The point estimates he reports axe similar to ours but he finds 
that over the sample 1961-1985 they are significantly different from each other, while 
over two subsamples (1961-1972, 1973-1985) they axe not. Apart from the different 
sample used, the major difference between the two sets of results is due to the size of 
the standard errors. Obstfeld’s estimated standard errors are in fact 100 times larger 
than ours. This indicates that the instruments he chose may have very little information 
regarding the risk aversion characteristics of each country.2
Finally, implicit in the three moment conditions we tested is the condition that 
consumption correlations are perfect. While the rejection of the cross equation restric­
tions contained in (6)- (8) suggests that consumption correlations are far from perfect, it 
is useful to examine the size of the estimated correlations which are implicit in the esti­
mated slope coefficients of (8) for two reasons. First, to formally test whether estimates 
of the correlation coefficient are different than 1. Second, because their magnitude may 
explain some of the differences between the results presented here and existing work. 
Table 4 presents the estimated correlation coefficients and the estimated standard errors 
when the instruments used are detrended domestic variables. Estimates obtained when 
the instruments used are shocks to domestic variables sire very similar and not reported 
here. Three major results stand out from the table. First, consumption correlations are
2To confirm our intuition we also conducted tests where we constrain the risk aversion coefficient to 
be the same in each country. As expected, this increases the rejection rate for all specifications we tried 




























































































significantly different from one in almost all cases for all types of cycles. This therefore 
confirms the informal analysis of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) and Devereux, Gre­
gory and Smith (1992). Second, consumption correlations are stronger and in some cases 
larger than output correlations for EEC countries, a result which suggest that countries 
with closer economic ties may also have more efficient consumption risk sharing mecha­
nism. Third, consumption correlations obtained with the UK as one of the country pairs 
are negative when LT detrended data are used, a result which suggests the presence of 
high durability content in UK consumption data (see also Blackburn and Ravn (1992)).
3.2 Long Run Implications
The risk sharing proposition is an appropriate idealization to describe a mechanism 
which insures cross-country aggregate consumption from domestic cyclical fluctuations. 
However, in the formulation we have described in section 2, there is nothing tha t prevents 
us from considering other types of fluctuations. In other words, it is also possible to 
investigate implication (6) of the risk sharing proposition even when domestic cycles have 
infinite length. In this case the consumption insurance relationship requires (i) that the 
aggregate consumption profile of pairs of countries should move together in the long run 
and (ii) tha t the error in predicting the logarithm of the marginal utility of consumption 
of country j ,  given the logarithm of the marginal utility of consumption of country k, 
should be unpredictable using long run characteristics of country j .  Intuitively, the two 
conditions imply tha t if international consumption insurance is in effect, the consumption 
profile across countries cannot permanently diverge. Obviously, as has been pointed out 
in the literature (see Melitz and Vori (1992)), if this type of insurance is in place, it 
involves an almost permanent system of income transfers across countries.
An analysis of the long run implications of international risk sharing may also 
shed some light on a related issue which is of interest to macroeconomists. Following the 
permanent income hypothesis tradition, it is typical to  identify the permanent component 
of income with the long run behavior of consumption (see e.g. Quah (1990)). Our cross 
country analysis may therefore shed light on the relationship among permanent incomes 
across countries and on the issue of convergence of national incomes, a topic which 
has received substantial attention in the current growth literature (see e.g. Barro and 
Sala-i-M artin (1992)).
We start by examining a weak long run implication of the risk sharing proposition: 
tha t the error in predicting the logarithm of the marginal utility of consumption of 
country j ,  given the logarithm of the marginal utility of consumption of country k, is 
a stationary process. This implication is weak because the error may be stationary but 
still be predictable given country specific characteristics. The essence of this implication 
can be easily tested using oointegration tools. We conduct tests for integration and 
cointegration in aggregate consumption data using Phillips’ Z -test3 and we find tha t we
3For sensitivity we also conducted tests using the Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Stock and Watson 




























































































cannot reject the hypothesis that aggregate consumption is an 1(1) variable, except for 
Switzerland. For each pair of countries for which consumption is an 1(1) variable, we 
then run a regression like log Cjt = a + b * log c*i +  eJt and check if the residuals contain 
a unit root.4 Table 5, panel A presents the results of these tests. In the table we report 
the least favorable outcome, that is we report the largest (in absolute value) t-statistics 
over possible lags augmentation, and the lag value at which it occurs. The results show 
that the eJ(’s appear to  contain a unit root in many cases (exceptions are the pairs 
Australia-Japan, Japan-Ftance, Australia-France in addition to some borderline cases). 
Hence, consumption patterns tend to permanently diverge and even this weaker version 
of the risk sharing proposition is generally unsupported in the long run.
For those countries for which consumption appears to be stationary (and for bor­
derline cases) we next examine the second implication of the proposition. Table 5, panel 
B reports the results. We find that risk sharing is rejected in the long run in half of these 
cases and that domestic consumption covaries in the long run with all the domestic vari­
ables we consider. Two interesting conclusions can be derived by combining the results 
of these two tests presented in table 5. First, there are some cross frequency effects 
with the stationary component of consumption reacting to long term movements in the 
economy. Second, permanent income across countries show little convergence, a  result 
which appears to contradict the long run implications of the basic neoclassical growth 
model.
4 C on clu sion s
In this paper we have analyzed some international aspects of the risk sharing proposi­
tion. We showed that risk sharing is a  property of optimal international consumption 
allocations in a wide variety of theoretical setups and we empirically examined whether 
the theoretical relationship is supported by the data. We find that aggregate domestic 
consumption seems to  be well insured against domestic shocks which are cyclical in na­
ture but tha t it tends to  covary with demographic and labor market variables, primarily 
over long cycles. We also show that although the orthogonality conditions imposed by 
the theory cannot be rejected when we consider domestic shocks, we do strongly reject 
both the cross equation restrictions and the implication that consumption correlations 
are perfect. We also show that very little risk sharing appeal's in the long run both in 
terms of long run comovements of consumptions across countries and of covariations with 
domestic instruments. As a by-product of the analysis, we have also provided estimates
consumption where the Stock and Watson test rejects the null of a unit root. We also experimented 
with different lags augmentation and excluding the linear trend from the regression, without important 
changes in the results. Tables with the results are available on request from the authors.
4 Because of the poor quality of consumption data and the relative short sample available we also 
considered an approach which imposes that pairs of consumption series are cointegrated with cointe­
grating vectors [1, -1] and examine whether or not the residuals display a unit root. Although some of 




























































































of the ratio of relative risk aversion coefficients for pairs of countries in the sample, which 
can be used by researchers interested in calibrating international business cycles models.
Our results are, overall, in agreement with those of Obstfeld (1989), (1993), Atkeson 
and Bayoumi (1991) and Lewis (1993). However, contrary to them we reject the idea that 
domestic consumption reacts to  several sources of idiosyncratic shocks and we are able to 
distinguish which of the implications of risk sharing with complete financial markets are 
at odds with the data. Our conclusions are also in line with those of Backus, Kydland and 
Kehoe (1992), Devereux, Gregory and Smith (1992) or Baxter and Crucini (1992). We 
do find that consumption correlations are both statistically and economically different 
from one but we also find that among European countries the correlations are higher 
than elsewhere and, in some cases, higher than output correlations, suggesting that some 
risk sharing is actually taking place.
Although the analysis we have conducted does not specify the market structure 
which can support the optimal allocations, there are at least two implications of our 
results which can be useful in designing mechanisms intended to implement first best 
allocations. We have shown that, whatever they are, existing market structures shield 
domestic consumption from idiosyncratic shocks sufficiently well (recall that government 
consumption expenditure does not play a major insurance role). This result seems to 
deny the need of further government intervention both in terms of providing automatic 
stabilizers in the economy and new institutions which may help the economies to achieve 
Pareto optimal allocations. However this statement needs two qualifications. First, the 
countries in the panel we examined are among the most industrialized of the world and 
for some of them temporary labor migrations or semi-permanent remittance programs 
from emigrants may have created an insurance program which need not to be present for 
other OECD countries or, worse, for LCD countries. Second, because domestic aggregate 
consumption covaries with some domestic variables over cycles of longer length, there is 
some room to improve the quality of consumption allocations by designing institutions or 
opening markets which insure agents against this type of fluctuations. However, insuring 
fluctuations of longer length may have a marked redistributive effects.
A second issue which is of interest concerns the need of integrating domestic fi­
nancial markets into a world market. Our results suggest that the opening of foreign 
financial markets to domestic consumers will be somewhat redundant in terms of welfare 
as the existing structures offer sufficient insurance against the most interesting sources 
of domestic fluctuations. Hence, the prospective integration of European financial mar­
kets and the current globalization of security markets are unlikely to  bring substantial 





























































































The data we use is all taken from Datastream. Consumption measures aggregate 
private consumption expenditure on nondurables, durables and services. It is trans­
formed into a per-capita series by dividing the original series by population. Because 
data on population is annual, quarterly data are obtained by taking the predicted values 
of an AR(3) regression fitted to  a dummy quarterly series, constructed assigning the an­
nual value to each of the four quarters. Government data measures current government 
expenditure except in the case of Australia where also gross government fixed investment 
is included. Income data measures gross domestic product (GDP) except for Japan, US 
and West Germany where it measures gross national product (GNP). All data is in real 
terms. The base year however, differs across countries. For Australia, Italy, Japan, UK, 
and West Germany the base is 1985, for France and Switzerland the base is 1980, for 
Canada the base is 1986 and for the US the base is 1987. All variables are measured 
in annual rates. Employment data is not completely compatible since it measures dif­
ferent aggregates in different countries. The series used measure total employment in 
Canada, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, UK, USA, West Germany, employment on the pay­
roll in Australia and civilian employment in France. Because some of these series are 
non-seasonally adjusted, we deseasonalize them by using an exponential smoothing pro­
cedure. UK employment data are the same as those employed by Blackburn and Ravn 
(1992). Finally, the price data measures the implicit price deflator for GNP (or GDP).
The sample we have available covers the period 1960,1-1991,4 for Australia, Canada, 
United Kingdom, USA and Germany; the period 1965,1-1991,4 for Japan; the period 
1967,1-1991,4 for Switzerland; and the period 1970,1-1991,4 for France and Italy. The 
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P—values for the J—test (in percentages): Detrended Instruments
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP SWI UK US WG
Linearly D etrended data
AUS 0.0143 0.0396 0.1008 0.0791 0.9778 0.0003 0.6023 6.3237
CAN 1.9655 0.0730 0.0131 2.9627 0.0001 0.0000 0.0079
FRA 1.7262 1.9468 6.2842 0.1165 0.5232 0.7088
ITA 0.2206 0.4928 0.8878 2.9091 0.2089
JAP 0.9912 0.0000 0.0161 0.9182
SWI 1.4268 7.5635 1.9050
UK 0.0041 0.0205
US 0.0090
H P  D etrended data
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP SWI UK US WG
AUS 0.8781 1.1076 12.965 10.040 25.763 7.2284 1.3623 14.541
CAN 15.918 3.3472 7.6228 4.2277 2.5303 0.8536 0.3313
FRA 8.8903 10.872 5.5677 7.3689 15.560 18.961
ITA 12.452 7.4112 3.4685 6.1406 74.793
JAP 16.439 5.1440 1.5182 40.020
SWI 27.766 14.668 14.614
UK 0.1582 4.2776
US 2.4461
FOD D etrended data
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP SWI UK US WG
AUS 27.133 24.361 17.586 10.810 34.740 6.0590 51.467 15.893
CAN 74.914 48.487 48.610 15.277 34.339 9?.790 18.617
FRA 15.146 49.769 38.609 62.368 43.603 59.375
ITA 18.040 12.192 6.2284 28.422 51.058
JAP 42.652 41.906 49.538 3.8762
SWI 26.881 54.242 39.708
UK 79.449 52.388
US 20.179
Notes: The instruments used to construct the J-tests are a constant domestic out­
put, domestic prices and domestic population lagged one and two periods. 





























































































P—values for the J—test (in percentages): Shock Instruments
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP SWI UK US WG
Linearly D etrended data
AUS 81.9882 46.2925 97.6432 73.4789 65.6436 67.3339 65.1412 79.8557
CAN 65.6527 59.7208 42.5670 68.9452 21.3315 26.3213 42.7275
FRA 66.5922 44.5308 34.3820 24.6531 55.7311 31.3766
ITA 39.1124 53.3856 60.1932 37.9021 22.1858
JAP 74.5787 19.1094 93.1501 98.0725
SWI 25.9047 51.7344 10.1648
UK 2.9673 5.8525
US 3.0361
H P D etrended da ta
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP SWI UK US WG
AUS 26.8775 44.3816 81.6847 2.9654 45.9652 29.9638 33.5965 20.1338
CAN 62.5038 75.9179 71.3667 65.4429 45.6255 50.0499 22.6597
FRA 58.9114 60.5837 32.4957 93.5456 56.5847 32.8338
ITA 60.0372 17.886 45.1379 33.8598 70.8611
JAP 52.9332 63.5244 15.1089 76.8317
SWI 54.5571 65.6172 76.2277
UK 50.3640 15.0141
US 10.7206
FOD D etrended data
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP SWI UK US WG
AUS 67.8751 43.2496 52.1166 25.2209 68.4601 95.7350 83.7958 99.0131
CAN 7.4336 34.0989 79.2133 31.9034 56.5786 53.2041 42.6540
FRA 73.5163 11.8144 16.1363 54.6077 30.4766 55.0956
ITA 4.0657 18.2037 69.9286 66.8692 12.6185
JAP 60.3460 89.4216 67.3000 46.6399
SWI 21.0858 21.2397 18.6343
UK 46.1325 28.9546
US 86.2626
Notes: The instruments used to construct J-tests are a constant, the current residuals and 
one period lagged residuals of a VAR(4) on domestic output, domestic prices and 





























































































Estimates of the Coefficients of Relative Risk Aversion
D etrended Instrum ents Shock Instrum ents
Country LT HP FOD LT HP FOD
AUS 1.006 1.282 0.819 0.947 1.486 0.859
(0.032) (0.049) (0.087) (0.052) (0.062) (0.104)
CAN 0.739 0.857 0.786 0.715 1.049 0.777
(0.036) (0.059) (0.082) (0.075) (0.087) (0.094)
FRA 1.940 1.621 1.170 1.808 1.677 1.138
(0.027) (0.016) (0.046) (0.040) (0.030) (0.068)
ITA 1.912 1.179 1.632 1.305 1.117 1.526
(0.056) (0.042) (0.037) (0.090) (0.063) (0.067)
JAP 0.472 1.020 0.695 0.546 1.045 0.678
(0.054) (0.044) (0.073) (0.117) (0.055) (0.120)
SWI 2.581 1.492 1.132 2.879 1.521 1.303
(0.017) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.071) (0.072)
UK 0.940 0.689 0.660 0.940 0.689 0.625
(0.038) (0.073) (0.089) (0.094) (0.106) (0.114)
GER 0.571 0.830 0.509 0.571 0.830 0.618
(0.022) (0.042) (0.049) (0.034) (0.058) (0.048)
Notes: The estimates are obtained from the variance restriction (13). Standard 




























































































T bb le  4: E s t im a te d  C o n su m p tio n  C o rre la tio n s
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP SWI UK US WG
Linearly Detrended data
AUS 0.767 0.387 0.246 0.809 0.154 -0.514 0.726 0.783
(0.027) (0.042) (0.047) (0.014) (0.063) (0.041) (0.038) (0.223)
CAN 0.638 0.393 0.629 0.560 -0.226 0.624 0.809
(0.044) (0.047) (0.035) (0.056) (0.071) (0.032) (0.020)
FRA 0.671 0.409 0.472 -0.184 0.292 0.586
(0.042) (0.054) (0.061) (0.061) (0.055) (0.057)
ITA 0.194 0.449 -0.112 -0.103 0.274
(0.023) (0.050) (0.041) (0.057) (0.041)
JAP 0.367 -0.225 0.443 0.826
(0.066) (0.031) (0.036) (0.015)







AUS 0.217 0.237 0.250 0.232 0.024 0.115 0.047 -0.194
(0.065) (0.083) (0.087) (0.072) (0.083) (0.061) (0.067) (0.068)
CAN 0.401 0.244 0.039 0.455 0.392 0.607 0.060
(0.069) (0.051) (0.058) (0.059) (0.049) (0.041) (0.071)
FRA 0.172 0.428 0.439 0.508 0.580 0.258
(0.075) (0.061) (0.091) (0.054) (0.090) (0.097)
ITA 0.317 0.468 0.395 0.060 0.205
(0.068) (0.058) (0.056) (0.080) (0.096)
JAP 0.287 0.552 0.408 0.229
(0.080) (0.065) (0.065) (0.080)







AUS 0.419 0.403 0.070 0.251 0.269 0.046 0.313 0.070
(0.068) (0.068) (0.097) (0.073) (0.093) (0.078) (0.066) (0.066)
CAN 0.297 0.133 0.071 0.344 0.089 0.531 0.133
(0.068) (0.112) (0.068) (0.103) (0.080) (0.059) (0.066)
FRA 0.065 0.299 0.355 0.169 0.162 0.305
(0.071) (0.068) (0.073) (0.092) (0.057) (0.064)
ITA 0.090 0.355 0.094 -0.038 0.048
(0.094) (0.118) (0.078) (0.101) (0.098)
JAP 0.035 0.077 0.267 0.091
(0.068) (0.048) (0.046) (0.053)



































































































t—■values of Philips Z—test
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP UK US WG
AUS -2.37 -3.88 -3.31 -4.40 -1.69 -2.88 -3.39
(10) (6) (6) (6) (10) (8) (8)
CAN -1.89 -2.15 -2.37 -1.37 -2.16 -3.30
(10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
FRA -3.39 -3.66 -1.93 -2.32 -3.46
(6) (10) (10) (10) (10)
ITA -2.98 -1.63 -2.02 -3.19
(6) (10) (10) (10)







P-values for the J - te s t  (in percentages): Long R un Cycles
AUS CAN FRA ITA JAP UK US WG
AUS 0.2636 0.0000 0.1043 0.0123
CAN 0.0000




Notes: The instruments used to construct J-tests are a constant, do­
mestic output, domestic prices and domestic population lagged 
one and two periods. The data is logged before the tests are 
conducted. Philips’ Z-test checks if the residuals of a cointe­
grating regression between pairs of consumptions are station­
ary. We report the worst possible case against the risk shar­
ing proposition over possible lag augmentations of the test. 
The number in parenthesis refers to the lag augmentation used 
(maximum value is 10). The test is run with no deterministic 
variables included. Empty cells in panel B indicate that no test 
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